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NOTES AND COMMENT
the obstacle that he was not accused under the statute of the Price
Control Act. Here is a vicious circle. A law which might be
flagrantly unconstitutional could be in effect indefinitely without
challenge.
Our law of conspiracy needs clarification, not to permit offenders
to avoid entrapment, but to allow each alleged transgressor to know
definitely that he will not be convicted for doing a lawful act in a
lawful manner and to prevent the exceptions from becoming so
numerous that they-completely overwhelm the original Section 37 of
the Criminal Code.
KATHARINE CURNEN MULLEN.
COMPETENCY OF CHILDREN AS WITNESSES; SIGNIFICANCE OF
OATHS TO CHILDREN
In New York, no unsworn testimony is admissible on the trial
of either a civil or a criminal case, except in one instance. The ex-
ception is to be found in Section 392 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure: '
The rules of evidence in civil cases are applicable also to criminal cases
except as otherwise provided in this code. Whenever in any criminal pro-
ceedings a child actually or apparently under the age of twelve offered as a
witness does not in the opinion of the court or magistrate understand the
nature of an oath, the evidence of such child may be received though not given
under oath if, in the opinion of the court or magistrate, such child is possessed
of sufficient intelligence to justify the reception of the evidence. But no
person shall be held or convicted of an offense upon such testimony unsupported
by other evidence.
The unsworn testimony of an infant is inadmissible in a civil
action 2 (unless waived by both parties), and that leads to our first
query, "At what age is an infant competent to testify under oath?"
Whereas, in a criminal jurisdiction, if a witness is over twelve, the
law presumes capacity; in civil jurisdiction there is no definite rule
as to the age at which an infant is competent to testify under oath.
The test is an individual one. In one case, it was held no error to
admit sworn testimony of a boy five years old; this on the ground
of the capacity and intelligence of the child, his appreciation of the
difference between truth and falsehood, as well as his duty to tell
the truth.3 A witness, six and a half years old, who knew she would
1 As amended by Chapter 279 of the Laws of 1892.2 Gehl v. Bachmann-Bechtel Brewing Co., 156 App. Div. 51, 141 N. Y.
Supp. 133 (1913); Arico v. New York Central 1. R., 240 App. Div. 721, 265
N. Y. Supp. 503 (1933).
3 Wheeler v. United States, 159 U. S. 523, 40 L. ed. 244 (1895).
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be punished if she told an untruth, was held competent.4
By Section 365 of the Civil Practice Act,5 the trial court may
examine a child of tender years before the child is sworn "so as to
ascertain his capacity and extent of his knowledge." 1 The court
sees the proposed witness, notices his manner, and resorts to any
examination which will tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence,
as well as his understanding of the oath.
It has been said that, "If a witness is over fourteen years of age
the law presumes him to possess the requisite discretion and under-
standing. If under that age, the duty devolves upon the trial court,
• . . to determine . . . capacity . . ." 7 In criminal cases it has
been held that, "the magistrate must examine a child under twelve to
determine whether the presumption of incapacity is overcome." 8
Our second query then is, "If twelve years is adopted as the
age when the law presumes competency in criminal cases, why is
the age of fourteen years set as the standard in some civil cases?"
The twelve-fourteen-year conflict is irreconcilable and seems to
be an arbitrary difference. A child of twelve, named X, testifying
in a criminal action would still be a child of twelve, named X, with
the same mental capacity, although now testifying in a civil action.
If X understands right from wrong, and that wrongs are punishable,
but does not understand the significance of an oath, is it justice to
exclude unsworn civil testimony? The stakes in civil matter do not
involve personal liberties and that probably accounts for the more
liberal rule in criminal evidence, but in both instances truth is what
the court should seek and not just the understanding of an oath.
"Does the taking of an oath necessarily secure the performance of a
public duty or the real truth in the trial of the case? Politicians and
moralists have placed much reliance on oaths as a practical security." '
In fact, in no jurisdiction has the use of the oath been abolished.
Wigmore calls for a special class of persons of whom an oath ought
not to be required, nor even the exercise of an option to affirm be
expected, namely children qualified to testify but lacking in theo-
logical understanding.10 In New York we have provided for such
exception but only in criminal cases.
4 Agnew v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co., 5 N. Y. Supp. 756, aff'd 117 N. Y.
651, 22 N. E. 1132 (1889).
5 C. P. A. 365: "Court may examine witness before swearing. The court
or officer may examine an infant or a person apparently of weak intellect pro-
duced before it or him, as a witness, to ascertain his capacity and the extent
of his knowledge; and may inquire of a person produced as a witness what
peculiar ceremonies in swearing he deems most obligatory."
6 Olshansky v. Olshansky, 185 App. Div. 469, 172 N. Y. Supp. 856 (1918);
Ellarson v. Ellarson, 198 App. Div. 103, 190 N. Y. Supp. 6 (1921).
7 People v. Linzey, 79 Hun 23, 29 N. Y. Supp. 560 (1894).
8 People v. Klein, 266 N. Y. 188, 194 N. E. 402 (1935).
9 W. Erskine Williams, The Oath as an Aid in Securing Trustworthy
Testimony (1931) 10 TExAs L. REv. 64, 66.
10 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE (3d ed.) §§ 488, 508.
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In Michigan," for children under ten, the oath may be dis-
pensed with. The nature of the child's belief is in theory to be
judged by the same theological standards but by simpler language and
more concrete tests. In Illinois,12 a witness who said she "would go to
hell" if she didn't tell the truth was accepted. However, in Arkansas, 13
the following was held not to have enough theology in it: "Do you
know what you mean when you hold up your hand and take the
oath ?" "Yes, sir; tell the truth." "If you were not to tell the truth,
what would be done to you?" "I don't know, sir." "Would it be
wrong?" "Yes, sir." In order to overcome this lack of understand-
ing and so as not to preclude testimony from being received, the
child's mind may be conditioned to be properly influenced by the
oath. In Massachusetts, 14 a temporary postponement of the trial
was allowed, enabling the child to be instructed by a priest.
Wrote Justice Buller,15 "If the first speech were without oath,
that there was such speech, makes it no more than a bare speaking
and so of no value in a court of justice." That this view, as to the
significance of an oath, has been modified, we note in the ruling as
to waiver: "In a case where an oath is required, the parties may
waive the administration of the oath, and the waiver may be either
express or implied." 16 But the waiver seems to be limited, or
rather, seems to be strictly interpreted. The unsworn testimony of
a seven-year-old boy as to how an accident in which another infant
was injured happened, was held to be insufficient to support a judg-
ment where there was no other proof, even though no objection was
made to the competency of the witness.17 Silence of counsel in
failing to object to such unsworn testimony cannot be considered a
waiver.18 The weight of a waiver is lessened in criminal cases in
that the Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 392, leaves it to the
court to determine if the intelligence of the child justifies the recep-
tion of the unsworn testimony; only in that instance, have we the
additional factor of the necessity of corroborative testimony before
conviction can be supported. It was found to be a harmless error
to admit unsworn testimony of a seven-year-old infant suing for per-
sonal injuries where no objection was taken thereto, and the jury's
verdict was not based solely upon such testimony.19 In a similar
case, the trial judge permitted a boy, nine years of age at the time
"1 Comp. L. 1915, § 12556; Coamp. L. 1929, § 14222.
12 Draper v. Draper, 68 Ill. 17 (1873).
'3 Crosby v. State, 93 Ark. 156, 128 S. W. 781 (1910).
14 Com. v. Tatisos, 238 Mass. 322, 130 N. E. 495 (1921).
i5 Bur~xR, LAW oF Nisi PPrus (Eng.) 294.
16 People ex rel. Niebuhr v. McAdoo, 184 N. Y. 304, 77 N. E. 260 (1906).
17 Scherback v. Stern, 246 App. Div. 746, 283 N. Y. Supp. 804 (1935).
'isRanofsky v. Frank, 208 App. Div. 213, 203 N. Y. Supp. 160 (1924).
Contra: Gavrilutz v. Savage, 166 App. Div. 309, 151 N. Y. Supp. 808 (1915).
19 Razaukas et aL. v. N. Y. Dugan Bros., Inc., 263 App. Div. 1002, 33 N. Y.
S. (2d) 411 (1942).
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he testified, to testify without having been sworn, over the objec-
tion of the defendants. The recovery here, however, was based so
largely on this unsworn testimony that it could not stand. Upon
the record, there was nothing that could be construed to be consent
to the reception of this testimony without the sanction of the oath.20
"The preliminary examination by the presiding justice as to
competency of a witness is not evidence in the action. It is not ad-
dressed to any issue and is for the consideration of the court only,
not of the jury. It is usually an informal conversation upon dif-
ferent subjects, designed to put the child at ease so that he will talk
naturally. His intelligence and ability to tell the truth are tested by
noting his answers and his general appearance...." The presump-
tion is that a child thus admitted without oath was duly found by
the trial court not to understand its nature. ". . . It (C. C. P. § 392)
limits the effect of such testimony by providing that no conviction
can be founded upon it unless it is supported by other evidence. It
permits the unsworn statement to be received for what it is worth,
subject to the test of cross-examination. A child may not be able
to understand the nature of an oath and yet be capable of telling
what he saw and heard on a certain occasion with entire accuracy." 21
We have no statute applicable to civil cases wherein the oath is
done away with when it is useless and the evidence might be valu-
able. Indeed, the court is not permitted to cast off the safeguard
of an oath which the law has placed on testimony in civil cases.2 2
There is no specific age below which capacity will always be
deemed wanting; even an infant under seven, if found to possess
sufficient knowledge of the nature and consequence of an oath, may
be sworn. Once the oath has been given, C. C. P. § 392 by its terms
does not apply and so generally no corroboration is thereafter neces-
sary-the jury must consider the weight of the testimony, the
competency has been ruled upon as a question of law. Even though
an oath has been administered, corroboration is still required by
statute as to confessions, rape, abduction, adultery, and other special
charges.
The Model Code of Evidence 2 3 attempts to answer the problem
of oaths to children, as follows:
Rule 101-Qualification of Witnesses.
Every person is qualified to be a witness as to any material matter unless
the judge finds that:
2 0 Michel v. Semer, 205 App. Div. 281, 199 N. Y. Supp. 512 (1923).
21 People v. Johnson, 185 N. Y. 219, 77 N. E. 1164 (1906).
22 Stoppick v. Goldstein et al., 174 App. Div. 306, 160 N. Y. Supp. 947
(1916).
23 Model Code of Evidence (1942) Ch. II, p. 91.
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(a) the proposed witness is incapable of expressing himself concerning
the matter so as to be understood by theC.judge and jury either directly or
through interpretation by one who can understand him, or
(b) the proposed witness is incapable of understanding the duty of a
witness to tell the truth.
Rule 11 of the Model Code requires the judge to try and de-
termine disputes as to the existence of facts, which are prerequisite
to the qualification of a witness. The judge must determine whether
the proposed witness understands his duty to tell the truth. The op-
ponent has the burden of seeing that the question is raised and that
there is evidence before the judge which would justify him in finding
incapacity. The conduct of the witness might be such as to impel
the judge to raise the question, treating such conduct as persuasive
evidence of incapacity, and consequently to require the proponent to
bring forward evidence of capacity.
Rule 103 of the Model Code does not require an oath; all that
is requisite in the "expression of purpose to testify only to the truth"
is that the "judge finds it to be binding upon the conscience of the
witness" who has qualified under Rule 101.
An illustration under the Model Code serves to show the result
of the proposed statute:
W, a child under seven years of age, is called to testify to an event
occurring when he was only five years of age. The judge finds that, while
W is incapable of making understandable answers to some pertinent questions
which might be asked, he is not incapable of making understandable answers
to appropriately framed relevant questions sufficient in number and variety to
constitute reasonable direct and cross-examination. W is qualified to be a
witness. 2 4
MAXINE K. DUBERSTEIN.
24 Id. at Ch. I, p. 87.
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